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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the.Matter of 
SMITHTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
COUNCIL OF ADMINISTRATORS AND SUPERVISORS, 
JL0.CAL._12L,_^ESA,...AEL=£IO^..^.: .• ,_.. 
Charging Party. 
#lA-9/25/81 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4976 
COOPER,. ENGLANDER & SAP IK, ESQS. (WILLIAM 
H. ENGLANDER, ESQ., DAVID M. COHEN, ESQ/, 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
PAUL J. DERKASCH, ESQ., for Charging 
Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Council of 
Administrators and Supervisors (CSA) to a hearing officer's | 
decision dismissing its charge that Smithtown Central School 
District (District) violated §§209-2a.1(a) and (d) of the Taylor 
Law in that it did not maintain the status quo with respect to | 
> 
8 
the salaries of unit employees while negotiating an agreement to j 
succeed one that had expired. f 
The District and CSA had been parties to a two-year agreementj 
j 
covering the 1975-76 and 1976-77 school years. During the first j 
year of that agreement, it was amended and extended for three \ 
I 
additional years. As amended, it included a scheduled salary rate" 
I 
for 1975-76, an increased scheduled salary rate for 1976-77 and j 
• 
another increased scheduled salary rate that remained the same 
for 1977-78, 1978-79 and 1979-80. After 1975-76,- however, unit I 
7075 
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employees were not to be paid at the scheduled rates. The 
amended agreement contained a reduced rate of implementation 
formula by which the scheduled salary rates would be reduced to 
yield a lower amount1, which'would actually be paid- to.'.the >unit 
employees.— This formula provided increases for each year of 
the contract period, which were paid, but the unit employees did 
not attain the scheduled rate by the end of the five-year
 ; 
contract period. 
The five-year agreement expired on June 30, 1980, and no 
successor agreement was reached by the opening of school in 
September 1980. When school opened in September 1980, the 
District paid the unit employees the same salaries they had been 
paid during the previous school year. The charge alleges that 
this was improper. It asserts that the District was obligated 
not to change the rate of pay of unit employees while negotiating 
a successor agreement. According to CSA, that meant payment at 
the scheduled rate, not the reduced rate. It contends that 
payment at the reduced rate called for by the formula was improper 
because the formula was a temporary contractual measure which 
expired with the contract, leaving the scheduled rate undiminished 
and operative. 
The hearing officer determined that the District was required 
to do no more, while it was negotiating a successor agreement, j 
3 
S 
than to continue paying the salaries it had been paying immedi- j 
I 
ately prior to the expiration of the five-year agreement. Finding 
that the District had done so, she dismissed the charge. [ 
—The implementation formula is appended to this decision together! 
with the parties' explanation and an illustration they prepared 
to show its application. :. .»_,~H,,o, 
• 
I/O s 
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DISCUSSION 
In support of its exceptions, CSA asserts that the reduced ] 
rate of implementation schedule of the former agreement expired i 
I 
with the agreement. This should be clear on the face of the j 
expired agreement, according to CSA, but in any event it could 
have been established by evidence as to the intent of the parties 
_had__£h.a.JiaariiLg___o£f±c£r--ji^ ^^  
introduction of such evidence. 
We find that the hearing officer committed no prejudicial 
error in the conduct of the hearing and we affirm her findings of I 
fact and conclusions of law. CSA is correct in its position \ 
" \ 
that the District could not alter the salaries of unit employees 
2/ 
while negotiating a successor agreement.— It is not correct, 
however, in its allegation that the District violated this 
obligation. The District paid unit employees the same salaries 
both before and -after the expiration of the parties' last agree-
ment. It thus maintained the status quo in existence at the time 
the agreement expired. CSA's argument that, by their agreement, j 
the parties intended the scheduled rate to be paid at the expira- j 
tion of the agreement is irrelevant to the District's Taylor Law 
obligation. This is because it merely raises a question as to the ! 
I 
meaning of the parties' agreement, the enforcement of which is j 
i 
beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. CSL §205.5(d) and j 
St. Lawrence, 10 PERB 1f3058 (1977). I 
-^See Levitt own UFSD, 14 PERB If 3019 (1981) 
077 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 25, 1981 
larold R. Newman, Chairman 
ctt-eu /Oyuu&~--
Ida Klaus, Member 
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APPENDIX 
Reduced Rate of Implementation Formula 
Year 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
Reduced Rate of 
Implementation 
0% 
257. 
50% 
75% 
80% 
Reduction in 
Cost of Formula 
100% 
75% 
50% 
25% 
20% 
Explanation 
Reduced Rate of Implementation is defined as the percent of the salary 
schedule increase set forth in the Minutes of the JoTnt Comir.ittee~Me"eting 
ot May 1, 19/5 that is actually to be paid by reason of this agreement. The 
calculations needed to develop the basic salary schedule will remain as in-
dicated in the attached documents except as indicated herein. (Emphasis in 
original.) . '• .__ •_ 
Illustration• 
Elementary Principal 
To determine 76-77 Salary: 
Current Salary Step 5E 
Scheduled Salary (76-77) 
33,109 
35.094 
1. Subtract current salary from scheduled Salary:.' 
.. •-".. Difference 
2. Increase 25% of Diff. 
3. Add to Current Salary 
To determine 77-78 Salary: 
1. Subtract 
2. 
3. 
Increase 
To determine 78-79 Salary: 
1. Subtract 
2. Increase 
3. 
To de te rmine 79-80 S a l a r y : 
1 . S u b t r a c t 
2. 
3. 
35,094 
-33,109 
•"1,983 
^ 
—ms 
33,109 
33,605 - S a l a r y f o r 76-77 
37,552 Scheduled S a l a r y 
-,.33,605 76-77 S a l a r y 
2J37W 
1,974 
+33,605 76-77 S a l a r y 
33,579" - S a l a r y f o r 77-78 
37,552 Scheduled S a l a r y 
-35 ,579 77-78 S a l a r y 
-T7TTS 
X .75 
y,b'6i> 
138 11 
17479775" = 
1,480 
+35,579 
37,059 
1,480 Increase 
Increase 
77-78 Salary 
78-7 Salary 
37,552 
-37.059 
—vn 
X__ .8 
""35575 
Scheduled Salary 
78-79 Salary 
Difference 
Increase 
394 Increase 
+37,059 78-79 Salary 
37,453 79-80 Salary 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS), 
Respondent, 
•and-
LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 
82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 
82, AFSCMS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
•and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS), 
Charging Party, 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 
82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
Upon the charge of a violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
#lB-9/25/81 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3980 
CASE NO. U-3981 
CASE NO. D-0178 
ROWLEY AND FORREST P.C. (RICHARD R. ROWLEY, 
ESQ, of Counsel} for Charging Party in 
Case No. U-3980 'and Respondent in Case 
Nos. U-3981 and D-0178 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ., (WALTER J. PELLEGRINI. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party in 
Case No. U-3981 and Respondent in Case 
No. U-3980 
MARTIN L. BARR, ESQ.- (JEROME THIER, ESQ., 
of Counsel)>for Charging Party in Case No. 
D-0178 ' • • ' • • -
 ? 
'ft © A 
f 
I 
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We have before us three related cases that were consolidated 
for hearing and decision. In the first case (U-3980]), the New York! 
i 
State Inspection, Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Districtj 
* 
Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. (DC 82) charged the Governor's Office I 
of Employee Relati ons of the State of New York (State) with 
_refus ing_._t.o_Jie.g.oi±at.e- -in -good -faith with- respect- to-an-agr-eement-—I 
1 
to succeed one which expired on March 1, 1979. In the second \ 
case (U-3981), the State charged DC 82 with refusing to negotiate 
in good faith with respect to the same agreement. The third 
charge (D-0178) was filed by Counsel to this Board (Counsel) and j 
alleged that DC 82 had engaged in, caused, instigated, encouraged | 
and condoned a strike against the State from April 18 to May 4, 
1979. The Hearing Officer found merit in the State's charge, but j 
! 
none in the charge of DC 82. With respect to the charge of \ 
Counsel, he found that DC 82 
did not engage in, directly cause, or instigate the I 
strike, but that it encouraged and condoned it in j 
violation of §210.1 of the Act, and that the primary I 
causative factor for the strike was the Union's ) 
attempted evasion of its obligation to negotiate I 
in good faith .' . . . . " J 
I 
Finally, the Hearing Officer found that DC 82's responsibility fori 
the strike was not diminished by any acts of extreme provocation 
on the part of the State. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of DC 82 which ! 
i 
contests all four of the conclusions of the Hearing Officer. It I 
I 
also argues that the Hearing Officer erred in many of his | 
i. 
subsidiary conclusions of law,; in his; findings of''fact arid in j 
i 
aspects of his conduct of the hearing, I 
i 
k 
if 
I 7081 
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Having reviewed the record, we affirm the material findings 
of fact and conclusions of law of the Hearing Officer, and we 
determine that he committed no prejudicial error in his conduct 
of the hearing. 
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS AS FOUND BY THE HEARING OFFICER 
The State and DC 82 commenced negotiations in December 1978 
for an agreement to succeed one covering employees in the 
Security Services Unit which was due to expire on March 31, 1979. 
It was understood by the parties that any agreement reached by 
the negotiators would be. subject to ratification by the members 
of DC 82. At a negotiating session which commenced on April 4, 
1979, and continued into the early morning hours of the following 
day, the negotiators for the."State.. and for DC 82.reached an-agreement 
in principle which was to be reduced to written form by a 
representative of the State and by the chief negotiator for DC 82, 
This was done, but on April 13, 1979, the negotiating committee 
of DC 82, having sensed that several of its locals and many of 
its members were dissatisfied with it, disavowed the agreement 
without its having been submitted to the membership for ratifica-
tion. DC 82 then demanded that the State resume negotiations, 
but the State refused to do so on the ground that the parties had 
reached an agreement which DC 82;/was required to submit for 
ratification. A 17-day strike commenced on April 18. Later 
that day, DC 82 issued a news release announcing its suoport of 
the strike. On April 20th, the State consented to resume negoti-
ations with DC 82 pursuant to the direction of Judge Conway 
I 7082 
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of the State Supreme Court. The strike was settled when the State! 
and DC 82 reached ah agreement on the underlying issues. 
The impact of the strike was severe. It disrupted services 
at State prisons and particularly at the maximum security 
facilities. The State appropriated $25 million to finance its j 
'i 
responses to the strike, which included the mobilization of ! 
' • ' | 
12,000 members of the National Guard and the redeployment of the 
State Police in order to maintain essential services at the 
prisons. The entrances to prisons were blocked by pickets, which 
necessitated the use of helicopters to obtain access -to the' -facilities.| 
There were also numerous acts of vandalism, but there was no 
record evidence attributing these acts to striking employees. 
THE REMEDIAL; ORDER 
The Improper Practice Cases 
The Hearing Officer recommended that the charge of DC 82 in 
U-3980 be dismissed because it failed to prove the commission of 
an improper practice,• ' We adopt his recommendation. We also adopt 
his finding in Case U-3981 that DC 82 refused to negotiate in good 
faith and his recommendation that it be ordered to cease and 
desist from refusing to negotiate in good faithwith the State. 
The Strike Case 
In accordance with the policy of this Board in strike cases, 
the Hearing Officer made no proposal with respect to the period 
of forfeiture of the dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges 
of DC 82. He merely reported the facts disclosed by the record 
which are relevant to the statutory criteria specified in 
§210.3(f) of the Taylor Law for the fixing by this Board of a 
duration of the forfeiture, 
Board - U-3980, U-3981, D-0178 -5 
The first of the statutory criteria for fixing the duration of 
the forfeiture is the extent of any willful defiance of the strike 
prohibition. Relevant to our consideration in this regard is the 
Hearing Officer's determination, which we affirm, that DC 82 en-
couraged and condoned the strike, but did not engage in it, cause 
it "directly; or" instigatert. The evidence^ shows" that 1;he strike ^  
was urged upon DC 82 by several of its locals and by unit employees 
who were dissatisfied with the agreement of April 4-)5, 1979 be-
tween DC 82 and the State. Thus, DC 82 did not lead the strike. 
By its public statements, however, it acknowledged that it sup-
ported the strike. 
The second statutory criterion is the impact of the strike on 
the health, safety and welfare of the community. .As indicated by 
the Hearing Officer, the impact was substantial. We note that the 
instant strike had a greater impact on the community than any 
prior strike in the twelve-year history of the Taylor Law. Its 
financial cost was high and it caused a dislocation in the lives 
of the 12,000 members of the National Guard who had to be mobi-
lized. The acts of- vandalism against the property of non-striking 
employees are also attributable to the strike. Even though the 
record does not establish that the acts were perpetrated by strik-
ing employees, it is clear that they would not have occurred if 
the prison guards had been performing their duties. Finally, the 
inmates at the State psychiatric centers for the criminally insane 
and prisons were denied many of the services to which they were 
7084 
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entitled by State policy, including mental health, educational and 
recreational programs. This was not only a hardship for the in-
mates , but it also had the strong potential of creating a volatile 
situation that could have endangered the community at large, par-
ticularly where maximum security facilities were involved. 
The- third statutory' -criterion-to-be_ applied -in -determining _the_ 
duration of the dues and agency shop fee forfeitures is the fin-
ancial resources of the striking employee organization. Unlike 
the first two criteria, this is not related to any aspect of the 
strike. It' concerns the question of how long the striking employee 
organization would be financially able to continue to function as 
the statutory representative of the public employees involved 
without the benefit of the dues checkoff or the agency shop fee 
deduction privilege. As noted by DC 82 in its brief, a recognized 
or certified employee organization has the basic statutory obli-
gation to represent employees in the negqtiation and administra-
tion of collective bargaining agreements, and the fulfillment of 
that responsibility is related to the organization's financial 
resources. 
We recognize that the imposition of a penalty which would 
result in the organization's financial inability to perform its 
statutory responsibility would mean its de facto decertification. 
7085 
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Such decertification would, we agree, be contrary to the intent 
of the Legislature in enacting the Taylor Law.— 
In support of its position that the third criterion requires 
this Board to impose, at most, a short period of forfeiture of 
dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges, DC 82 submitted 
-evidence -of its—financial resources to-show-that -it -i-s -now-in—such 
financial difficulty that it would be unable to service the unit 
employees if it lost those privileges. The evidence submitted 
was in the form of financial statements for the years 1977, 1978 
and 1979. Going beyond the data submitted, it argues that it 
would be more severely hurt by the loss of dues and agency shop 
fee deduction privileges than most employee organizations because 
the geographic dispersion of its negotiating unit and the multiple 
1/ The 1966 Taylor Law bill which passed in the Senate but not the 
Assembly included as a penalty for striking, 
revocation of the recognition or certification of 
such organization and forfeiture of the rights 
accompanying such certification or recognition, 
either indefinitely or for a specified period of 
time as the Board shall determine, (CSL §210.3(f) 
as proposed by S.I, 4784, S.P, 5689 of 1966) 
Consistent with this revocation, it did not include considera-
tion of the financial resources of the striking employee 
Organization as a criterion for fixing the duration of the 
penalty. The provision for revocation of recognition or 
certification as a penalty for striking was deleted from the 
1967 version of the bill which was enacted, and the requirement 
that the financial resources of the employee organization be 
considered as a factor in setting the penalty was added. 
^A.Qg 
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shifts on which unit employees work would make the direct collec-
tion of dues particularly difficult: Further, it offers the un-
supported opinion of the officers of some of its locals that only 
ten to twenty percent of unit employees would pay dues if there 
were no checkoff. The impact of its loss of checkoff for one 
month would, therefore, it says, be as onerous for DC 82 as a six-
month loss would be for the typical smaller employee organization 
or one with a more centralized- structure. 
We find that the record evidence does not establish that DC 82 
would be unable to accord the employees in its unit the required 
statutory services if it lost its checkoff privileges for any 
period of time. Its argument concerning the impact of a loss of 
checkoff privileges is based upon mere conjecture which we find 
unpersuasive. 
The appropriate procedure under the statute.is for this Board 
to fix the duration of the checkoff penalty on the basis of the 
first two criteria and as much relevant and currently ascertain-
able information relating to the third criterion as is now before 
us. It is conceivable that the third criterion may, under appro-
priate circumstances, require a reconsideration of that penalty. 
If, after having made exhaustive good faith efforts to do so by 
all reasonable alternative methods to the checkoff, the employee 
organization is unable to collect sufficient dues necessary to 
perform its statutory duty of representing unit employees in the 
negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements, 
a motion to this Board to reconsider the duration of the penalty 
Board - U-3980, U-3981, D-0178 -9 
might then be appropriate. At this time, on this record, the 
DC 82 argument directed at its financial resources, is plainly 
premature. 
/.••/•/.•Applying the-three--statuto.ry:,'e'r;iteri-a, .
 ;we. determine = 
that the impact of the strike upon the safety and welfare of the 
ciDmtiruni ty was " so severe" that~a~ dues""and"agency shop" f ee - deduct ion 
forfeiture of 24 months would have been appropriate if DC 82 had 
led the strike. However, inasmuch as the extent of its willful 
defiance of the Taylor Law was diminished by the fact that it did 
not lead the strike, although it supported it, we determine" that 
an 18-month forfeiture of DC 82's checkoff privileges is appro-
priate. The record evidence relating to the financial condition 
of DC 82 does not warrant imposing a lesser penalty. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER 
1. That the charge in U-3980 be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED, 
2. That, as a consequence of our sustaining the charge 
in U-3981, DC 82 is hereby ordered to cease and 
desist from refusing to negotiate in good faith 
with the State of New York, and 
3. That the dues deduction and agency shop fee 
privileges, if any, of DC 82 be forfeited, 
commencing on the first practicable date 
and continuing thereafter for a period of 
Board - U-3980, U-3981, D-0178 -10 
18 months. Thereafter no dues or agency shop 
fees shall be deducted on its behalf until 
it affirms that it no longer asserts the 
right to strike against any government, as 
required by the provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
If it becomes necessary to utilize the dues ' 
and agency shop fee deduction process for the 
purpose of paying the whole or any part of a 
fine imposed by order of a Court as a penalty 
in a contempt action arising out of the 
strike herein, the suspension of the dues 
and agency shop fee deduction privileges 
ordered hereby may be interrupted or postponed 
for such period as shall be sufficient to 
comply with such order of the Court, whereupon 
the suspension ordered hereby shall be resumed 
or initiated as the case may be. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 24, 1981 
laus, Member Ida Klaus,
David C. Randies., Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent, 
•and-
PATROLMEN *S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
COUNTY - OF NASSAU-, INC .-, 
Charging Party, 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NASSAU COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU. 
Respondent, 
-and-
SUPERIOR OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE 
POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE COUNTY OF 
NASSAU, INC., 
Charging Party. 
#109/25/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4132 
CASE NO. U-4311 
CASE NO. U-4360 
EDWARD G. McCABE, ESQ. (BEE & DeANGELIS, of 
C o u n s e l ) , f o r €h©~£oMhvty. o§£N:asjsaLU'ir c.y 
RICHARD HARTMAN, ESQ.(MICHAEL C. AXELROD., ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Patrolmen's Benevolent Assoc. 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ. (BARRY J. PEEK, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Nassau Chapter, CSEA 
BURGER & LAVALLEE, ESQS. (RAYMOND G. LAVALLEE, 
of Counsel), for Superior Officers Assoc. 
'<.,.«,/' 
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I 
The charges herein were filed by the Patrolmenvs Benevolent { 
Association of the Police Department of the County of Nassau, Inc.] 
I 
(PBA) (U-4132), Nassau County Chapter of the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) (U-4311), and Superior Officers 
Association of the Police Department of the County of Nassau, Inc. 
(SOA) (U-4360) against the County of Nassau (County), Each of the 
charges alleges that the County acted improperly in that it uni-
laterally altered a health insurance program which had • been avail-
able to County employees in the negotiating units represented by 
the three employee organizations.. Each of the parties has filed 
exceptions to the decision of the hearing officer, who concluded 
that the County violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with 
the three employee organizations and ordered it to cease doing so 
and to negotiate. The County asserts that this Board lacks juris-
diction over the subject matter of the charges, while the employee 
organizations complain that the hearing officer erred in some of 
her findings:..of fact and; conclusions of law and in,-failing;, to. 'order'. ' .••." 
the County to make affected employees whole -by compensating them 
for losses, suffered. 
FACTS 
The County and the three employee organizations had collec-
tive bargaining agreements which expired on December 31, 1978, 
each of which provided for health insurance. The CSEA contract 
provided: 
"The County shall fully pay the health insurance premiums 
of its employees under the existing plans for the coverage | 
they elect.... This is subject to all State Regulations 
and statutes...." (emphasis supplied) 
This language was carried forth into a successor agreement on 
April 5, 1979. The County's agreements with SOA and PBA, which | 
1 
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had expired, had provide'd, "The County shall pay the full contri-
bution for all health insurance plans authorized pursuant to 
Article XI of the Civil Service Law." There were no successor 
contracts when the charges were filed and the negotiation disputes 
had been brought to interest arbitration,by SOA and PBA. 
At the time the prior contracts were negotiated, three health 
,-in-s-urane e - plans- had- been—avai-lable pursuant --to ^ Article XT ^ of" the 
Civil Service Law -- Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Group Health Insur-
ance (GHI) and Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York (HIP). 
On June 22, 1978, the County was notified by the State Civil 
Service Commission that the HIP program would be replaced by a 
Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York/Health Maintenance Organ-
ization (HIP/HMO) program, which would be more comprehensive and 
more expensive. This change took effect on January 1, 1979. 
Thereafter, owing to some confusion on the part of the County 
Comptroller, the County paid the HIP/HMO premiums to the State on 
behalf of those employees who had been enrolled in HIP. In May 
1979, however, the County's chief executive was notified by the 
State Civil Service Commission that, commencing August 1, 1979, 
the State could no longer collect HIP/HMO premiums and the County 
would have to contract directly with HIP/HMO. The County notified 
Count, employees, on June 25, 1979, that, effective AugUSt 1, 1979, 
HIP/HMO was no ..longer a fully paid option available under Article j 
I 
XI of the Civil Service Law, and that employees in the old HIP j 
i 
program could transfer to one of the two remaining programs; alter-j 
-
 s
 1 
natively, they could enroll in the HIP/HMO program on a contribu- s 
tory basis. \ 
7092 j 
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When the employee organizations found out what had occurred, 
they asked the County to negotiate with them and the County 
agreed. It met with the employee organizations on July 5, 1979, 
at which time they demanded that the County pay for HIP/HMO in 
full. The County did not agree and the employee organizations 
broke off negotiations and turned to litigation. CSEA and SOA 
-commenced -an—action for- a -judgment- -seeking-a—deelar at ion -that--the-
County's refusal to pay the full cost of the HIP/HMO program vio-
lated its contractual obligation to the two employee organiza- j 
• 
tions as well as Article 44 of the Public Health Law. PBA 
supported the Court action amicus curiae. On. September 25, 1979, 
the Supreme Court, Nassau County, ruled against the employee 
organizations. Interpreting the agreement of April 5, 1979, the 
Court ruled that the reference to "existing plans" was to the 
programs authorized by.Article XI of the Civil Service Law which 
existed under the prior agreement. The Court determined that a 
fully paid HIP/HMO program was not such a program and that it was 
neither an extension nor a continuation of HIP. CSEA v. Purcell, 
101 Misc, 2d 649, aff'd without opinion, AD2d r'7 (February 2, 
1931), mot. for lv. to appeal den'd, . AD2d (April 14, 1981). 
The charges of PBA, CSEA and SOA were filed respectively on 
July 16, 1979, October 18, 1979 and November 11, 1979., After a 
consolidated hearing on the three charges, the hearing officer 
• 
determined that the County violated §209-a.l(d) in that it unilat-
erally introduced a new contributory health insurance program. 
However, she rejected the allegation that it altered an existing 
program on the theory that the HIP program had ceased to exist 
by reason of the action of the State Civil Service Commission. 
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The hearing officer also found that the notification to the 
affected employees did not constitute direct negotiations with 
them. Finally, she found that the County had- been willing to 
negotiate with the unions for an insurance program to substitute 
for the HIP program and that its failure to do so was occasioned 
by the refusal of the unions to participate in such negotiations. 
She issued ^ 
notice. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, the County asserted that the hearing 
officer erred in concluding that its conduct constituted an 
improper practice. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the 
findings of fact of the hearing officer, but we reverse her 
conclusion of law that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
1/ 
Taylor Law, thus sustaining the County 's exception. The hearing 
officer concluded that the County acted unilaterally on June 25, 
1979, when it notified employees that effective August 1, 1979, 
they could enroll in the HIP/HMO program on a contributory basis, 
i 
This presumes that the County's action on June 25 was final and j 
dispositive of the rights of unit employees. 
By our reading of the record, this is not what occurred. 
The notice sent out by the County on June 25, 1979, was merely 
1/ The major thrust of the exceptions of the employee organiza-
tions is that the remedial order proposed by the hearing 
officer is inadequate. Given our determination on the merits, 
this.position becomes irrelevant. 
This leaves CSEA's argument that the hearing officer erred 
in finding that the County had been willing to negotiate with 
the employee organizations on July 5, 1979, We reject it j 
because the hearing officer's finding is supported by the j 
evidence, 
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an announcement of an anticipated change. When the three employee 
organizations then asked the County to negotiate the change, it 
agreed to do so and a negotiating session was held on July 5, 
1979. Negotiations did not continue after that day only because 
they were broken off by the employee organizations. By breaking 
off negotiations in the face of the County's announcement of its 
anticipated change, the employee organizations waived their right 
2 / 
to complain when, on August 1, 1979, the change took effect, 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: Albany, New York' 
September 24, 1981 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
trtCctr /C%**t*^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
2/ See County of Rensselaer. 8 PERB 1(3039 (1975), in which this 
Board held that action taken by a public employer was not 
improper when it had informed the employee organization of the 
change it-hat--was contemplated and'the employee organization 
never sought to negotiate the matter. 
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•DISSENTING OPINION OF BOARD MEMBER RANDLES . 
In the opinion of the Majority of this Board, the County 
did not act unilaterally on June 25, 1979, when it notified 
employees that effective August 1, 1979, they could enroll in 
the HIP/HMO program on a contributory basis. Its reasoning is 
that the action of June 25 was a mere announcement which had no 
legal, status . 
I disagree with this conclusion of fact. By its action of 
June 25, the County established a new health insurance program 
to replace the one that had been eliminated by the State Civil 
Service Commission, By taking unilateral action, the County 
violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. City School Dis-
trict ,of, Oswego v. PERB, 42AD2d 262 (3d Dept., 1973), 6 PERB 1f.7003. 
The fact ..that1,'when asked-to do so,.•it.'was willing to negotiate 
the matter thereafter, and that it did negotiate the matter on 
July 5, 1979, does not cure its conduct of June 25. 
Ordinarily, the County, having acted unilaterally, should 
have been ordered to negotiate with the employee organizations.— 
However, it was willing to do so, but the employee organizations 
refused, Having refused to negotiate, their subsequent claim that 
the County acted improperly when the change took effect is without 
merit. Accordingly, although concluding that the County had vio-
lated §209-a,l(d) of the Taylor Law, by reason of the subsequent J 
1_/ A remedial order directing the County to rescind its unilateral 
action was properly rejected by the hearing officer because it 
was not sought by any of the charging parties and it would 
injure the unit employees. 
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conduct of the parties, I would order no remedy. 
-8 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 24, 1981 
David C. Randies, Member 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MC GRAW CENTRAL SCHOOL UNIT NO. .1, CORTLAND 
COUNTY CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent, 
upon the Charge of Violation of §210.1 of the 
Civil Service Law. 
#lD-9/25/81 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 
D-0224 
On July 10, 1981, Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that the McGraw Central School Unit No. 1, 
Cortland County Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Associ-
ation, Inc. (Respondent) had violated Civil Service Law (CSL) 
§210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned and 
engaged in a one-day strike against the McGraw Central School 
District (District) on May 20, 1981. The charge further alleged 
that approximately 14 non-instructional employees, out of a 
negotiating unit of 34, participated in the strike. 
The Respondent filed an answer but thereafter agreed to with-
draw it, thus admitting the factual allegations of the charge, 
upon the understanding that the Charging Party would recommend, 
and this board would accept, a penalty of loss of Respondent's 
right to have dues and agency shop fees deducted to the extent of 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount that would otherwise be 
y 
deducted during a year. The Charging Party has so recommended. 
1/ This is intended to be the equivalent of a three-month 
suspension of such right. Since the deductions are not made 
uniformly throughout the calendar year, it is expressed as a 
fractional percentage of the annual deduct'ion. 
t »-*''«-/( 
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On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
Respondent violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike as 
charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is a 
reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the deduction rights of the McGraw Central 
School Unit No. 1, Cortland County Chapter, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., be suspended, commencing on the 
first practicable date, and continuing for such period of time 
during which twenty-five percent (25%) of its annual agency shop 
fees, if any, and dues would otherwise be deducted. Thereafter, 
no dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf by 
the McGraw Central School District until the McGraw Central 
School Unit No, 1, Cortland County:,Chapter, Civil Service . , 
Employees Association, • Inc.: affirms', that^ 'it•• no" longer asserts . the-
right to . strike against any government, as required by the pro-
visions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 24, 1981 
--ijL^/f./U* 
Rarold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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